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Abstract
This paper examines a two-period moral hazard model with an inequality-averse agent. We
show how the agent's past performance will help the principal to relax incentive compatibility
constraints and how the existence of an inequality aversion of the agent aects a level of wage in
each period in a long-term contract. In particular, we focus on the performance in period 1 on
the level of wage in period 2. We show that the agent's wage in period 2 depends on performance
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1 Introduction
In recent years, other-regarding concerns such as fairness and reciprocity have been introduced into
strategic environments by many researchers.1 In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) propose a class of preferences with inequality aversion and investigate their
implications in economic models. It is observed that other-regarding preferences may have a positive
role in a moral-hazard situations (Charness, 2004; Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Hannan,
Kagel, and Moser, 2002). The observation has stimulated research into a theoretical analysis of the
contract theory.2 Itoh (2004) examines the fundamental properties of the second-best contract with
other-regarding preferences by introducing the Fehr-Schmidt utility function. By using a continuous-
eort model of Holmstrom (1979), Englmaier and Wambach (2010) set up a model where an agent
has an inequality-averse preference, which is a variant of the Fehr-Schmidt preference, and provide a
comprehensive treatment of the moral-hazard problem under inequality aversion.
Most works of behavioral contracts employ a one-period moral hazard model. However, since
the works of Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985), the importance of long-term contracts are widely
recognized. This paper aims to examine how inequality-averse concerns aect long-term labor con-
tracts. In particular, we incorporate inequality aversion into the standard model of repeated moral
hazard, developed by Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985).3 Our formulation of inequality aversion
follows the work of Englmaier and Wambach (2010) with a variant of Fehr-Schmidt preference. We
clarify the properties of the rst-best contract and the second-best contract. Since we assume that
individuals have separable utility functions, the rst-best contract is independent of the history of
outcomes: the second period wage function is determined only by the current outcome. In the case
of the second-best contract, the second-period wage function is dependent on the past histories. In
such a case, the rst-period economic performance, which determines the rst-period inequality, also
1See Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
2Many works focus on the eects of other-regarding preferences on optimal contracts. Other-regarding concerns
are introduced into relationships between a principal and an agent (Itoh, 2004; Dur and Grazer, 2008; Englmaier and
Wambach, 2010), between agents (Demougin, Fluet, and Helm, 2006; Bartling, 2008; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010a;
Neilson and Stowe, 2010), between agents in team production (Daido, 2004, 2006; Rey-Biel; 2008; Bartling and von
Siemens, 2010b), and between agents in tournaments (Grund and Sliwka, 2005).
3For other papers on repeated moral hazard, see Radner (1981) and Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salanie (1994).
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aects the second-period eort level of the agent. Thus, economic performance and inequality in the
second period depend on the rst-period outcomes, and the interaction between the past inequality
and the current inequality arises in our model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates our model. Section 3 presents
our results. Section 4 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains detailed derivations of our results.
2 The model
A principal hires an agent to work and the relationship between them is repeated for two periods. We
basically follow the notation introduced by Englmaier and Wambach (2010). In period t 2 f1; 2g, the
agent selects a level of eort et 2 [e; e]. The outcome (prot) xt 2 [x; x] is realized at the end of each
period depending on the level of the eort. Then, x1 and x2 have distribution functions F (x1je1)
and F (x2je2), with everywhere-positive density functions in the intervals, f(x1je1) and f(x2je2),
respectively. These probability functions are assumed to be dierentiable. Note that the outputs,
x1 and x2, are independently distributed over time, so the past realization, x1, does not yield any
information on the current realization of the prot x2. The eort exerted in one period has no eect
on the prot in any other period.
We impose the monotone likelihood ratio property:
@ fe(x1je1)f(x1je1)
@x1
> 0;
@ fe(x2je2)f(x2je2)
@x2
> 0:
The principal's strategy is to determine what wage is paid in each period. Let w1(x1) and
w2(x1; x2) denote the wages paid to the agent in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The contract oered
by the principal species the pair of wages w = fw1(x1); w2(x1; x2)g. Note that w2 depends on x1
and x2.
The principal's net expected utility is
EUP =
Z x
x
f(x1je1)

x1   w1(x1) +
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[x2   w2(x1; x2)]dx2

dx1:
Note that the principal is risk-neutral.
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Given the contract, the agent decides how much eort et to exert in each period t. Let the pair
of eorts made by the agent be denoted by e = fe1; e2(x1)g. Note that e2 can depend on x1.
The agent's payo consists of three parts: utility from wealth u(wt), cost incurred from eorts
c(et), and inequality aversion G(xt   2wt) (explained below). We also assume that u0() > 0 and
c0() > 0.
EUA =
Z x
x
f(x1je1)

u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))
+
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  c(e2(x1))]dx2

dx1   c(e1);
with G0()
(
> 0 if [x1   w1(x1)] > w1(x1) or [x2   w2(x1; x2)] > w2(x1; x2)
< 0 if [x1   w1(x1)] < w1(x1) or [x2   w2(x1; x2)] < w2(x1; x2)
G00() > 0; G(0) = 0; G0(0) = 0:
G represents the other-regarding concern. Under our formulation, the agent is altruistic toward the
principal if the agent's income exceeds the principal's income, while the agent feels envy otherwise.
The timing of the game is organized as follows. The players can precommit to a two-period
contract beforehand. At the beginning of period 0, the principal oers the wage contract w =
fw1(x1); w2(x1; x2)g. Then, the agent can decide whether to accept the oer or not. If the agent
rejects the oer, the game ends and the agent obtains an identical reservation utility U=2 in each
period. If the agent accepts the oer, he chooses a level of eort, e1, in period 1. At the end of period
1, both players observe the realization of prot x1. In period 2, the agent chooses the level of the
eort, e2(x1). At the end of period 2, x2 is realized, and both the principal and the agent observe it.
Then, the wage is paid to the agent.
3 Analysis
In this section, we begin by solving the rst-best problem, and then consider the second-best problem.
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3.1 The rst-best contract
We now examine the case where the level of the eort is contractible, i.e., there is no moral hazard
problem. Then, the principal's maximization problem is given by
max
fe;wg
EUP =
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[x1   w1(x1) +
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[x2   w2(x1; x2)]dx2]dx1;
subject to (PC)
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))+Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c(e1)  U:
The constraint in this problem is called a participation constraint (PC). It requires that working for
the principal is at least as good as other work opportunities for the agent.
The Lagrangian of the problem, LF , is as follows:
LF =
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[x1   w1(x1) +
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[x2   w2(x1; x2)]dx2]dx1
+ 
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))+Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c(e1)  U
	
;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of (PC). Dierentiating LF with respect to w1(x1) and w2(x1; x2),
we obtain
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] = 1; (1)
[u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))] = 1: (2)
Then [u0 + 2G0] = 1 holds under the rst-best contract.
Dierentiating (1) with respect to x1 and (2) with respect to x2 and rearranging the expressions
yield
w01(x1) =
1
2
+
u00(w1(x1))
8G00(x1   2w1(x1))  2u00(w1(x1)) ;
@w2(x1; x2)
@x2
=
1
2
+
u00(w2(x1; x2))
8G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  2u00(w2(x1; x2)) :
The following result states the slope of the rst-period wage function.
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Proposition 1. Under the rst-best contract,
(i) if the agent is risk-neutral with respect to wealth, then w01(x1) = 1=2;
(ii) if the agent is risk-averse with respect to wealth, then w01(x1) 2 (0; 1=2).
Proof. See the Appendix. 
According to Proposition 1, the slope of the wage in period 1 is 1=2 when the agent is risk-neutral,
while that of the wage in period 1 is greater than 0 and less than 1=2 when the agent is risk-averse.
This result is similar to the result of Englmaier and Wambach (2010), which incorporates inequality
aversion into a one-period moral-hazard model.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When the agent is risk-neutral, only inequality
matters. In the presence of inequality aversion, the agent dislikes the income dierence between the
two. Thus, both get a more equitable share, yielding w01(x1) = 1=2. When the agent is risk-averse,
he prefers the slope of the wage to be more at, yielding w01(x1) < 1=2.
Next, consider the wage function in period 2. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the rst-best contract,
(i) if the agent is risk-neutral with respect to wealth, then @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 = 1=2;
(ii) if the agent is risk-averse with respect to wealth, then @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 2 (0; 1=2);
(iii) @w2(x1; x2)=@x1 = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The intuitions behind Proposition 2 (i) and (ii) are the same as those behind Proposition 1 (i)
and (ii), respectively. Proposition 2 (iii) states that the realization of the outcome in period 1 has
no eect on the wage of period 2. This is because the principal chooses the optimal level of eort
in each period by the assumption that the eort can be contracted. Thus, we can conrm that the
cross eect @w2(x1; x2)=@x1 is zero.
3.2 The second-best contract
Subsequently, we examine the case where the level of eort cannot be contracted. The oered contract
cannot be made contingent on the agent's choice, and thus, there exists a moral-hazard problem. The
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rst and second constraints are incentive constraints in periods 1 (IC1) and 2 (IC2), which require
that the agent's strategy is incentive-compatible in both periods:
(IC1) e1 2 argmax
e^
Z x
x
f(x1je^)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))
+
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c(e^); (3)
(IC2) e2(x1) 2 argmax
e^
Z x
x
f(x2je^)[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e^): (4)
Following the rst-order approach, equations (3) and (4) are replaced by the rst-order conditions of
the agent, (IC1') and (IC2'), respectively (see below). The second-best contract is then obtained as
a solution to the next problem:
max EUP =
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[x1   w1(x1) +
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[x2   w2(x1; x2)]dx2]dx1;
subject to
(PC)
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))+Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c(e1)  U;
(IC1')
Z x
x
fe(x1je1)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))+Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c0(e1)  0;
(IC2')
Z x
x
fe(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c0(e2(x1))  0:
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The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is dened as follows:
L =
Z x
x
f(x1je1)[x1   w1(x1) +
Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[x2   w2(x1; x2)]dx2]dx1
+ 
Z
f(x1je1)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))+Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c(e1)  U
	
+ 1
Z x
x
fe(x1je1)[u(w1(x1)) G(x1   2w1(x1))+Z x
x
f(x2je2(x1))[u(w2(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c(e2(x1))]dx1   c0(e1)
	
+
Z x
x

2(x1)
Z x
x
fe(x2je2(x1))[u(w(x1; x2)) G(x2   2w2(x1; x2))]dx2   c0(e2(x1))
	
dx1:
Dierentiating the Lagrangian L with respect to w1(x1) and w2(x1; x2), we have
(+D1)[u
0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] = 1; (5)
(+D1 +D2)

u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))

= 1; (6)
where
D1 = 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1) ; D2 =
1
f(x1je1)2(x1)
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1)) :
Dierentiating (5) with respect to x1 and (6) with respect to x2, we have
w01(x1) =
1
2
+
1
2u
00(w1(x1)) + 1
@

fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

@x1
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] 1+D1
4G00(x1   2w1(x1))  u00(w1(x1)) ;
@w2(x1; x2)
@x2
=
1
2
+
1
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  u00(w2(x1; x2))

8<:12u00(w2(x1; x2)) + u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))+D1 +D2 2(x1)f(x1je1) @
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))
@x2
9=; :
Before presenting our results, we discuss how the incentive constraints distort the contracts by
comparing (1) with (5) and (2) with (6).
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Let us consider period 1. D1 is the dierence between the rst-order conditions of the rst-best
and second-best contracts. This represents a distortion arising from the incentive constraint. We
provide an interpretation of this term. Note that 1 is the Lagrange multiplier of (IC1'). It then
represents the marginal change of the principal's expected utility arising from a marginal relaxation
of (IC1'). D1 can be interpreted as a marginal value of deviation from optimal risk sharing.
4
Subsequently, we consider period 2. We focus on the dierence of rst-order conditions between
the rst-best and second-best contracts. The distortion of period 2 between the two contracts is
decomposed into two terms, D1 and D2. D1 is the rst-period distortion. Then, the second-period
wage function is directly aected by the rst-period incentive constraint.
We explain D2. Note that 2(x1) is the Lagrange multiplier of (IC1'). It represents the marginal
change of the principal's expected utility arising from a marginal relaxation of (IC2'). Then,
2(x1)=f(x1je1) represents a conditional value of the sensitivity of (IC2') on the realization of the
outcome of period 1. Moreover, an interpretation of fe(x2je2(x1))=f(x2je2(x1)) is as a benet-cost
ratio for deviation from optimal risk sharing in period 2 depending on the realization of the outcome
of period 1. As a whole, D2 can be interpreted as a marginal value of deviation conditional on x1.
It is noteworthy that this term depends on both the rst-period and second-period outcomes.
We now present our results on the wage function in period 1.
Proposition 3. Under the second-best contract,
(i) if the agent is risk-neutral with respect to wealth, then w01(x1) > 1=2;
(ii) if the agent is risk-averse with respect to wealth, then w01(x1) > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
In the absence of inequality aversion, if the agent is risk-neutral, then the rst-best eort is
achieved by a simple contract. The solution is an upfront \sale" of the prot to the agent before
the prot is realized since the delegation is costless to the principal. Thus, the agent can obtain
residuals of all prot, and only providing incentives matters. In this case, similar to the standard
moral-hazard problem, the principal oers the wage with slope 1 in each period, that is, w01(x1) = 1
4See Holmstrom (1979, p.79).
9
and @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 = 1.
Proposition 3 (i) states that in the presence of inequality aversion, the slope of the wage in period
1 is greater than 1=2 and not equal to 1. Thus, considering the case where the agent does not care
for the whole risk of the prot but cares for the dierence in income distribution, the slope is greater
than 1=2 and less than 1.5 Proposition 3 (i) and (ii) can be interpreted as extensions of Englmaier
and Wambach's (2010) study of one-period contracts.
We next present our results on the wage function in period 2.
Proposition 4. Under the second-best contract,
(i) if the agent is risk-neutral with respect to wealth, then @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 > 1=2;
(ii) if the agent is risk-averse with respect to wealth, then @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 > 0;
(iii) @w2(x1; x2)=@x1 > 0 if @[2(x1)=f(x2j(e2(x1)) fe(x2je2(x1))=f(x2je2(x1))]=@x1 > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 (i) and (ii) explain how the outcome in period 2 aects the wage in period 2. These
results have the same implications to Proposition 3 (i) and (ii). Proposition 4 (iii) states a sucient
condition for the positive responsiveness of w2 to x1.
We now explain why Proposition 4 (iii) holds. In general, the sign of the slope of the wage in
period 2 with respect to x1 can be positive or negative. As shown in the Appendix, we have the
following equation:
@w2(x1; x2)
@x1
=
1
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  u00(w2(x1; x2))| {z }
(+)
 u
0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))
+D1 +D2| {z }
(+)

8>>><>>>:1
@ fe(x1je1)f(x1je1)
@x1| {z }
(+)
+
@

2(x1)
f(x2je2(x1))
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))

@x1
9>>>=>>>; : (7)
The expression in the braces of (7) is the key to determine the sign of @w2(x1; x2)=@x1. As
such, we focus on two terms in this brace, @D1=@x1 = 1@[fe(x1je1)=f(x1je1)]=@x1 and @D2=@x1 =
5If the limited liability constraint exists, then this ensures that the slope of the wage is bounded between 0 and 1.
For more detail, see Innes (1990).
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@[2(x1)=f(x2j(e2(x1))fe(x2je2(x1))=f(x2je2(x1))]=@x1. The two terms represent the second-period
distortion eect of deviating from optimal risk sharing as x1 changes. We call the rst term the rst-
period-distortion eect. Since the second-period wage function directly depends on the rst-period
distortion, the rst-period outcome aects the second-period wage through the rst-period distortion.
It is clear that the rst-period distortion eect yields a positive impact.
The second term represents an indirect eect of the rst-period outcome. Since the eort is
state-contingent, a change in the rst-period outcome induces a change in the second-period eort.
This leads to a change in the distortion related to the second-period incentive constraint. We call
the second term in the brace the commitment eect.
As stated in Proposition 4 (iii), if the commitment eect is positive, then the wage in period
2 is increasing in x1. Thus, the higher the eort level that is exerted in period 1, the higher the
wage in period 2 is. On the other hand, if the commitment eect is negative, then the sign of (7)
is ambiguous: it is positive when the rst-period-distortion eect dominates the commitment eect,
but is negative when the rst-period distortion eect is dominated by the commitment eect.
Finally, we explain a persistent feature of economic inequality. Note that the Lagrange multiplier
1 in the rst period is aected by the inequality aversion G of the agent. Then, 1 partially reects
the degree of inequality in the rst period. The Lagrange multiplier 1 is included in the second-
period rst-order condition (6). Therefore, the second-period outcome, which includes economic
performance and inequality, depends on both the rst-period Lagrange multiplier 1 and the second-
period Lagrange multiplier 2. This implies that the degree of inequality in the second period
correlates with that in the rst period.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the repeated moral hazard under inequality aversion. We claried the
properties of the second-best contracts. In particular, it was shown that the wage is dependent of
the past history under the second-best contract. Moreover, we characterized the basic mechanism of
the historical dependency of the worker's wage.
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Throughout this paper, we considered the two-period case. Our results can be extended to the
T -period model (T  3). As in the two-period model, past histories aect the optimal contract,
but the mechanism is more complicated. The fundamental suggestion is, however, the same: the
principal must take both current-period and future-period incentives and inequality aversion into
account to exert the agent's eort. To clarify this point, consider the three-period case. We explain
how the rst-period outcome x1 aects the wage in the third-period. First, the third-period eort
directly depends on the rst-period outcome x1. Second, there exists another indirect eect. The
second-period eort, which determines the distribution over the second-period outcome, depends on
the rst-period outcome x1. Thus, the rst-period outcome x1 aects the third-period eort through
the second-period outcome.
The persistence of past histories is observed in various experiments. For example, the results
of multiple trials of the public-goods experiment contrast with that of a single trial. In the case of
a single trial, most subjects cooperate with each other: they contribute 40-60% of their allotments
(Camerer, 2003). When the game is repeated, the cooperative behavior of subjects declines sharply
(Kim and Walker, 1984; Isaac, Walker, and Thomas, 1984; Andreoni, 1988). What is the cause of
this decline? Researchers have provided various explanations by experimental and theoretical studies.
One reasonable hypothesis is a reciprocity consideration among subjects (Dawes and Thaler, 1988).
In this case, past history matters for subjects. However, it is not obvious how past history relates to
a reciprocity consideration. In a general class of game with a long-term relationship, the relationship
is signicant but complicated when players have other-regarding preferences. Our analysis claried
the mechanism for a simplied but important class of games.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Dierentiating LF with respect to w1(x1), we have
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] = 1: (1)
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Dierentiating (1) with respect to x1 yields
u0(w1(x1))w01(x1) + 2G
00(x1   2w1(x1))(1  2w01(x1)) = 0
) w01(x1) =
2G00(x1   2w1(x1))
4G00(x1   2w1(x1))  u00(w1(x1))
) w01(x1) =
2G00(x1   2w1(x1))  12u00(w1(x1)) + 12u00(w1(x1))
4G00(x1   2w1(x1))  u00(w1(x1))
) w01(x1) =
1
2
+
u00(w1(x1))
8G00(x1   2w1(x1))  2u00(w1(x1)) : (8)
(i) Consider the case where the agent is risk-neutral. Note that u00() = 0 holds. Substituting
u00() = 0 into (8), we have w01(x1) = 1=2.
(ii) Next, consider the case where the agent is risk-averse. Since u00() < 0 and G00() > 0 hold, the
second term of (8) is negative. Thus, we have w01(x1) < 1=2. Since u00() < 0 and G00() > 0 hold, we
have
w01(x1) =
1
2
+
u00(w1(x1))
8G00(x1   2w1(x1))  2u00(w1(x1)) >
1
2
  u
00(w1(x1))
2u00(w1(x1))
= 0:
Thus, we have w01(x1) 2 (0; 1=2). 
Proof of Proposition 2: Dierentiating LF with respect to w2(x1; x2), we have
[u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))] = 1: (9)
Dierentiating (9) with respect to x2 and rearranging the above expression, we have the following:
u00(w2(x1; x2))
@w2(x1; x2)
@x2
+ 2G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))

1  2@w2(x1; x2)
@x2

= 0
) @w2(x1; x2)
@x2
=
1
2
+
u00(w2(x1; x2))
8G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  2u00(w2(x1; x2)) : (10)
(i) If the agent is risk-neutral with respect to wealth, u00(w2(x1; x2)) = 0 holds. By (10), we have
@w2(x1; x2)=@x2 = 1=2.
(ii) If the agent is risk-averse, u00(w2(x1; x2)) < 0 holds. Since the second term of (10) is negative,
we have @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 < 1=2.
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(iii) Dierentiating (9) with respect to x1, we have
u00(w2(x1; x2))
@w2(x1; x2)
@x1
+ 2G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))

 2@w2(x1; x2)
@x1

= 0
) @w2(x1; x2)
@x1
= 0:
Thus, we have the desired results. 
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Dierentiating the Lagrangian with respect to w1(x1) and rearranging
this, we have 
+ 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] = 1: (5)
Dierentiating (5) with respect to x1, we have
0 =1
@

fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

@x1

u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))

+

+ 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

[u00(w1(x1))w01(x1) + (1  2w01(x1))2G00(x1   2w1(x1))];
w01(x1) =
1
2
+
1
2u
00(w1(x1)) + 1
@

fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

@x1
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] 1
+
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)
4G00(x1   2w1(x1))  u00(w1(x1)) : (11)
Since the agent is risk-neutral, u00() = 0 holds, yielding the following equation:
w01(x1) =
1
2
+
1
@

fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

@x1
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] 1
+
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)
4G00(x1   2w1(x1)) : (12)
Since the monotone likelihood ratio property is assumed, @(fe(x1je1)=f(x1je1))=@x1 > 0 is implied.
Then, the signs of the second term are all positive except
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] 1
+ fe(x1je1)f(x1je1)
: (13)
To examine the sign of the above expression, we focus on the rst-order condition (5), again. This
condition ensures that both terms [u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))] and [ + (fe(x1je1)=f(x1je1))]
have the same sign. Thus, since the second term of (12) is positive, we have w01(x1) > 1=2.
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(ii) Arranging (11) yields
w01(x1) =
2G00(x1   2w1(x1))
4G00(x1   2w1(x1))  u00(w1(x1))
+
1
@

fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

@x1
[u0(w1(x1)) + 2G0(x1   2w1(x1))]
+ 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

[4G00(x1   2w1(x1))  u00(w1(x1))]
:
The rst term is positive since G00(x1   2w1(x1)) > 0 and u00(w1(x1)) < 0 hold. The second term is
positive by (13) > 0. Thus, we have the desired result, w01(x1) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Dierentiating the Lagrangian with respect to w2(x1; x2), we have
(+D1 +D2)

u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))

= 1; (6)
where
D1 = 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1) ; D2 =
1
f(x1je1)2(x1)
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1)) :
Dierentiating (6) with respect to x2, we have
u00(w2(x1; x2))
@w2
@x2
+ 2(1  2@w2
@x2
)G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))

+
1
E
 2(x1)
f(x1je1)
@ fe(x2je2(x1))f(x2je2(x1))
@x2
[u0(w2(x1; x2))  2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))] = 0;
where
E =

+ 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1) +
2(x1)
f(x1je1)
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))

:
Similar to the above cases, dierentiating this expression with respect to x2, we have the following:
@w2(x1; x2)
@x2
=
1
2
+
1
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  u00(w2(x1; x2))

8<:12u00(w2(x1; x2)) + u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))h+ 1 fe(x1je1)f(x1je1) + 2(x1)f(x1je1) fe(x2je2(x1))f(x2je2(x1)) i
02(x1)
f(x1je1)
@

fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))

@x2
9=; : (14)
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Since the agent is risk-neutral, substituting u00(w2(x1; x2)) = 0 into (14) yields
@w2(x1; x2)
@x2
=
1
2
+
1
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))

8<:u0(x2jw2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))h+ 1 fe(x1je1)f(x1je1) + 2(x1)f(x1je1) fe(x2je2(x1))f(x2je2(x1)) i
02(x1)
f(x1je1)
@

fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))

@x2
9=; : (15)
The second term of (15) is positive by the rst-order condition, the shape of function G, and the
monotone likelihood ratio property. Thus, we have @w2(x1; x2)=@x2 > 1=2.
(ii) Rearranging (14) yields
@w2(x1; x2)
@x2
=
2G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  u00(w2(x1; x2)) +
1
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  u00(w2(x1; x2))

8<:u0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))h+ 1 fe(x1je1)f(x1je1) + 2(x1)f(x1je1) fe(x2je2(x1))f(x2je2(x1)) i
02(x1)
f(x1je1)
@

fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))

@x2
9=; : (16)
The rst and the second terms of (16) are positive, similar to Proposition 3. Thus, we have
@w2(x1; x2)=@x2 > 0.
(iii) Totally dierentiating the rst-order condition (6) with respect to x1, we have
@w2(x1; x2)
@x1
=
1
4G00(x2   2w2(x1; x2))  u00(w2(x1; x2))| {z }
(+)
 u
0(w2(x1; x2)) + 2G0(x2   2w2(x1; x2))h
+ 1
fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1) +
2(x1)
f(x1je1)
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))
i
| {z }
(+)

8>>><>>>:1
@

fe(x1je1)
f(x1je1)

@x1| {z }
(+)
+
@

2(x1)
f(x2je2(x1))
fe(x2je2(x1))
f(x2je2(x1))

@x1
9>>>=>>>; :
The sign of the derivative, @w2(x1; x2)=@x1, depends on the sign of the last term in the brace.
Thus, if @[2(x1)=f(x2(e2(x1)))  fe(x2(e2(x1)))=f(x2(e2(x1)))]=@x1 > 0 holds, we always have
@w2(x1; x2)=@x1 > 0. 
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